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Abstract—We propose an interactive algorithmic scheme for
outsourcing matrix computations on untrusted global comput-
ing infrastructures such as clouds or volunteer peer-to-peer
platforms. In this scheme, the client outsources part of the
computation with guaranties on both the inputs’ secrecy and
output’s integrity. For the sake of efficiency, thanks to interaction,
the number of operations performed by the client is almost
linear in the input/output size, while the number of outsourced
operations is of the order of matrix multiplication. The scheme is
homomorphic, based on linear codes (especially evaluation/inter-
polation version of Reed-Solomon codes). Privacy is ensured by
encoding the inputs using a secret generator matrix, while fault
tolerance is ensured by the high error detection and correction
capability of the code. The scheme can tolerate multiple malicious
errors and hence provides an efficient solution beyond resilience
against soft errors.
I. SCENARIO
Computational power is often asymmetric. On the one
hand, global computing platforms such as clouds available
through internet provide a large scale of computational power
and resources, but remain susceptible to various kinds of
malicious attacks and faults. While on the other hand, a
relatively weak local client is secure and reliable. The goal
of today’s computing infrastructure is to provide solution to
draw the benefits of both of these components while ensuring
secrecy of certain inputs.
In a scenario (Figure 1) where a weak but reliable client
outsources a computation on a given input, the client should be
able to efficiently verify the correctness of the result returned
by the untrusted platform. Solutions for general computations
either rely on Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs) [1],
or fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes as in [5].
Considering their complexity, these constructions are currently
beyond practical use. However, authors in [9] propose a new
construction that can efficiently verify general computations
under cryptographic assumptions. This construction compactly
encodes computations as quadratic programs [4] which are
then encoded as elements of a group equipped with a bi-
linear map. The weak client receives a proof (of constant size)
along with the computational result. The verification procedure
involves group operations.
Furthermore, on large scale computing systems error re-
silience is an issue. Error probability increases with the node
count [2]. Algorithm-based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) [7] so-
lutions have been explored for matrix computations without
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Fig. 1. Outsourcing a task to an untrusted platform
considering privacy. Focusing on a small rate of soft errors,
an ABFT dense linear system solver is provided in [2] that is
based on a low density parity check. Soft errors in general are
produced in case the computing system is subject to cosmic
radiations. Yet, on externalized computing platforms, malicious
attacks that may corrupt a large number of intermediate com-
putations are of concern. Such massive attacks occur due to
Trojan attacks, and more generally orchestrated attacks against
widespread vulnerabilities of a specific operating system that
may result in the corruption of a large number of resources.
In [10], an ABFT efficient solution for matrix multiplication
is proposed for integrity against massive attacks that is based
on a Reed-Solomon code.
In this work we extend this solution in both directions.
First, to provide secrecy, we use a secret code, based on
a private Vandermonde generator matrix. Second, we extend
the scheme to more general matrix computations such as LU
factorization or matrix powering (with application to connected
components in a graph), where the output data is non-linear in
the input data. A major constraint is efficiency: trivial lower
bounds for the cost of an interactive scheme are the size of
the input and the output (memory cost) and the work of the
best known algorithm (computational cost). We propose an
asymmetric scheme for matrix multiplication that is almost
optimal with respect to both the input/output size on the
reliable resource (user side) and the best upper bound on the
unreliable one (global computing platform side).
II. ABFT DENSE MATRIX MULTIPLICATION
As most of the linear algebra computations reduce to
dense matrix multiplication, the design of the interactive zero
knowledge protocol for computations is based on outsourcing
matrix product. For the sake of clarity, we restrict in the sequel
to k × k square matrices. The goal of these protocols is to
keep the complexity of the operations almost linear in the
size O(k2) of the input on the weak client, while on the
unreliable cloud, a complexity O˜(nω) would be acceptable,
where 2 < ω ≤ 3 denotes the exponent of matrix multipli-
cation cost. A standard way for ABFT matrix multiplication
consists in encoding the left and right operands by multiplying
each by the generator matrix of a linear code [2], [7]. In the
sequel, we use Evaluation-Interpolation linear codes, denoted
RS (Reed-Solomon). These codes defined over a base field F
are maximum distance separable. Assuming F larger enough,
for any n with card(F) ≥ n > k, an (n, k) RS code is
characterized by a k × n matrix G. A source vector x of size
k is encoded by y = x · G; any configuration of (n − k)/2
errors in y is guaranteed to be corrected.
The proposed secured ABFT protocol is as follows. The
weak client initiates the protocol by generating two (n, k) RS
codes, defined by G1 and G2. The input k × k matrices A
and B are encoded as: GA = tr(G1) · A and GB = B · G2,
where tr denotes the transpose map. G1 and G2 are kept secret
which eventually makes A and B secret. The client sends GA
and GB to the global platform that performs the computation
and sends back a result matrix R. Various errors may occur
during computations or communications that are modeled by
an insecure or noisy channel: the received matrix is seen as
a perturbation of the correct encoded result GC = GA · GB .
Upon decoding R, the client obtains a matrix C˜ which verifies
C˜ = A · B + E, where En×n is the error matrix. The client
can correct up to (n−k)2/4 errors in C˜ to recover C = A ·B.
The cost of computation on the reliable client sums to the
cost of encoding and decoding. The encoding of each row or
column reduces to k polynomial evaluations of degree k in
n points, each computed in O(nlog2n) with precomputation,
so O˜(n2) for the full matrices A and B. With fast extended
GCD, decoding can be performed in O(nlog2n) for each row
or column, so O˜(n2) for the matrix C˜. The multiplication is
performed by the remote platform in O(nω).
The client also has the possibility to verify the correctness
of the result. This verification allows to detect cheating work-
ers and even prevents man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. A
cheating worker may not compute the matrix product correctly
(and hopes that the fault remains undetected) while in the
MITM scenario, an adversary might simply intercept the com-
munication between the client and the platform and replaces
the result by some other good-looking matrix, ex. the adversary
might replace the matrix R by GAtr(GA). For verification i.e.
testing if C = AB, we propose to use probabilistic Freivalds’
algorithm [3] which runs in O(n2), and states the correctness
with good probability.
To ensure secrecy of inputs, the generator matrices G1
and G2 are kept secret. The evaluation points are randomly
chosen and kept secret. However, if secrecy is discarded, the
evaluation points are chosen to be 1, α, α2, . . . , αcard(F)−2,
where α is a generator of the multiplicative group of the base
field F. With this choice of evaluation points, Fast Fourier
Transformation (FFT) allows fast encoding and decoding and
provides a logarithmic advantage. We note that a small field
(such as F2) would not provide enough evaluation points.
III. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE : INTERACTIVE BLOCK LU
DECOMPOSITION
Extending the idea, we also propose an ABFT interactive
block LU decomposition protocol where the client outsources
the task of LU decomposition to the platform. This protocol
follows the standard block LU decomposition algorithm, where
the inverse of the diagonal element is calculated locally and
the blocks below the diagonal element are updated. The task of
updating the sub-matrix to the right and below of the diagonal
element is shared between the cloud and the client. We note
that sub-matrix update requires the computation of matrix
multiplication, hence is outsourced thanks to the previous
matrix multiplication. Upon retrieving the product, the update
operation reduces to addition and is performed locally. This
interaction outsources the larger part of computation to the
remote platform, while the smaller part is performed by the
client. Let K be the block size: the cost of computation on
client’s side is O˜(n2Kω−2) for block inversions and column
update, and O˜(nωK−ω+2) for sub-matrix updates; while on
the untrusted cloud, the cost is O(nω). For ω = 3, the
optimality is obtained when the block size is K =
√
n.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design an efficient alternative to FHE
based outsourcing with acceptable practicality and security.
Our ABFT solution is resilient against malicious errors and
hence goes beyond the correction of soft errors and can even
handle MITM attacks. The scheme computes matrix operations
such as matrix-matrix multiplication and can be extended
to interactive protocols performing more complex operations
on matrices. The ongoing work includes quantifying security
provided by our scheme, the study of the related cost-security
trade-off and include other computations in the framework.
While this work is based on large finite fields, a perspective
is the design of efficient solution for floating point numbers,
based on dedicated encoding for matrix multiplication.
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